in light of what the majority of this semester has been spent on - visual perception - i wanted to offer up the very fundamental question of what we should count as seeing.
you may consider the tye-nanay-dretske debate over the speckled hen as a springboard into this problem; what counts as seeing, such that we should consider our beliefs about the speckled hen justified?
for example, tye uses the problem of the speckled hen to present his overall theory of seeing: we count as seeing something iff we can ask about it: "what is that?"
should we agree with tye?
I'm inclined to agree with Tye, though I'm not inclined to accept his further view that I can be in a position to ask, "What is that?" about O without knowing anything at all about it. In other words, I would suggest that:
ReplyDeleteS sees O iff S is able to ask, "What is that?" about O on the sole basis of occurrent visual experience.
AND
S sees O iff there is some visible property F such that S knows of O that it is F on the sole basis of occurrent visual experience.
Can you think of any counterexamples to this knowledge requirement? Consider Tye's discussion of this. Do any of his examples succeed in showing that S can see O without knowing anything about it?
it's worth noting that if we accept a tye-ian definition of what counts as seeing, then sorensen will have to provide a reason for why this is wrong, because he argues that when we when are presented with a silhouette we actually "see" the far side of the silhouetted object.
ReplyDeleteI was thinking about this after you mentioned it the other day, Grant, and there are two options here for Sorensen:
ReplyDelete1. Reject Tye's criterion for visual consciousness.
2. Argue that when we ask of a silhouetted object, "What is that?" what we're actually asking about is the far (light-blocking) surface of the object. (Or, perhaps: we're asking what that surface belongs to, what it's a surface of.)
And supposing we think Tye's criterion is a good one -- what then of option 2?
Seeing is tricky because it's difficult to pinpoint if it's a purely physical phenomenon or if it also requires some kind of mental activity.
ReplyDeleteThe physical definition would be basically light reflecting off an object into a visual receptor, etc. while the mental definition would require some kind of acknowledgment, such as "What is that?" (Tye)
For a while I was supporting the physical definition, but I'm starting to buy Tye's definition more and more. The only way to confirm if something or someone sees something is if they respond to it in some way, and this can only happen if they can "What is that?" about it.
As for Professor Leddington's question, I do believe S can see O without knowing anything about it. As long as S is visually aware of O's presence in some form (even if it's an illusion/hallucination), then it is conceivable that S can see O but not know what it is he's seeing. After all, he's asking "What is that?" not saying "Oh, I see that thing I know something about."
Rob,
ReplyDeleteIt seems to me that if I actually do ask, "What is that?" about something, then I definitely know something about it. For instance, I know something about the direction in which it is located. Maybe I know something about its color or its shape. But it seems that I know *something.*
So, the issue is this: suppose I *could* ask "What is that?" on the basis of the phenomenology of my visual experience, but I *don't* do so. In this case, is it possible that I don't know anything about the object?
as for grant's question regarding sorensen, it seems that leddington's option number two is something akin to what tye might propose, so they need not disagree.
ReplyDeleteas for rob's comments, i believe it should be pointed out that there are many instances in which the "physical theory" and the "mental theory" would be contradictory. for example, recall the speckled hen. light is bouncing off each speckle and into your eye, yet tye's stance is that you do not see each speckle. it seems that the "physical" theory is insufficient in these instances, and i have come to prefer tye's theory over any "physical" explanation of seeing. it seems to me that tye's theory better captures the true phenomenal character of visual experience.
to be clear, the question of what counts seeing is not necessarily a question of whether or not the thing is clearly identifiable by me. this is obvious by many examples, such as seeing barack obama without knowing that that man that you see is barack obama. there does seem to me to be a separation here, though, between what counts as seeing (i saw that man who is barack obama), and what the content of our visual experience is (do i count as seeing barack obama, or just a man?)
also, with regards to seeing and knowing, i agree with professor leddington here. it is difficult to imagine any instance in which i might count as seeing some thing, but would not count as having any knowledge about that thing.
ReplyDeleteone such scenario to ponder in tye's favor here is the case of the distracted driver. arguably, he sees the things all around him (evinced by the fact that he arrives safely at his destination), but may not have knowledge about those things (as is supposed to be evinced by the fact that the driver may not remember anything about what he saw).
so far, my response remains skeptical of how he could have driven successfully without at least the vaguest knowledge of the locations and motions of all of the things he saw, or at least his orientation in relation to them. it seems to me then that the driver would have been doing some subconscious activity akin to sleepwalking. in this case, then, i do not believe the driver should count as seeing anything (even on tye's theory) because he is not enabled for demonstrable thought about the objects.