In Chapter Three of Consciousness Revisited, Tye criticizes his earlier "phenomenal concepts" approach to introspection.
First, let's try to get clear about the nature of this approach. What is a phenomenal concept supposed to be?
Second, why exactly does Tye abandon the phenomenal concept strategy? Do you think he's right to do so?
Well I think a phenomenal concept is what comes out of our own introspection, when we acknowledge the phenomenal character of what we are perceiving.
ReplyDeleteBut it would seem that Tye rejects the idea of phenomenal concepts because people can be mistaken about what it is they are acknowledging the phenomenal character of; in other words, there does not seem to be a necessary connection between what is being perceived phenomenally and what the person perceiving something acknowledges it to be.
I think you're onto something here, Rob, but I'm not sure that I follow you exactly. How exactly is that supposed to constitute an objection to the phenomenal concept strategy?
ReplyDeletePerhaps it will help to think of this: phenomenal concepts are supposed to be special concepts that we can only acquire once we have certain experiences. Is this related to your point?
I agree with Tye's criticism of his earlier position on phenomenal concepts. I think its clear that a full understanding or "conception" of a given object, event or experience relies on more than indirect knowledge or a description of it. However, in order to even speak of something at all, we must first have SOME conception of it, even if its incomplete. For example, a baby born on a space station may have never experienced gravity, but they can learn about it and develop a concept of what gravity is before they ever experience it for themselves. It is only enhanced when that experience occurs. For physicalists, this seems to be obvious, because our thoughts of gravity are as physical as our experience of gravity, and thus the concept of the latter is merely an augmentation of that of the former, rather than something completely different.
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