One of Tye's principal claims about perceptual experience is that it is
transparent. Problem eight in
Ten Problems of Consciousness (TPC) is "the problem of transparency," and it is discussed in some detail at the opening to chapter five, where Tye uses it to support his intentionalism (his identification of phenomenal character with phenomenal content). (He returns to the topic in much greater detail in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of
Consciousnes, Color, and Content.)
In thinking about these topics, here are some questions you should try to answer:
1. What does it mean to say that experience is transparent, according to Tye?
2. How does the transparency of experience support Tye's intentionalism?
3. Is experience really transparent? Do phenomena such as your ability to blur your vision by squinting put transparency into question?
To focus on the third question, I would argue that experience really is transparent. When you blur your vision, you cannot really introspect on the overall "blurriness" of your vision. In fact, when you focus in further on this idea of blurriness, you really focus on all of the other things in your field of vision that have become blurry. You may summarize all of these instances of blurriness by saying that your entire vision is blurred, but really each object you view is blurred. It is very hard to even describe blurriness without describing its effect on a certain other object. If someone asked you to describe what blurry "looks like" you would think of an example, say a person's face, and describe the difference between the experience of their face with your eyes open, and your eyes squinted. You cannot acurately describe blurriness in general. Consider squinting your eyes in the dark, there is really not an effect at all on the darkness. So blurriness, does in fact, depend on what object has been blurred. I think these two examples illustrate pretty well that blurred vision does not invalidate the idea of transparency at all, but rather, reinforces it.
ReplyDeleteA courageous first poster!
ReplyDeleteAnd an excellent post: this seems to be a very promising reply in support of the transparency thesis.
But let me press a bit: when your vision is blurred, does your visual experience really represent the objects as blurry? That is, does the blurriness really seem -- that is, visually seem -- to be a property of the objects? If so, then why do we speak of blurring *our vision*, rather than blurring the things we see?
And what about cases of double vision? Try crossing your eyes. Does introspecting the qualitative character of such an experience really involve inspecting features of the objects as represented? How *are* the objects represented in double vision? (For one thing, when I hold my finger up in front of me and cross my eyes, it doesn't look like there are two fingers there. What, then, does it look like? How does my experience represent the world in this case?)
Also: what should the opponent of transparency say about Sami's darkness example? Is it a problem?
ReplyDeleteIn the case of double vision, introspection may seem at first to not focus on the objects we are seeing. We need not focus on the shape or color of the objects, or even the number since crossing your eyes does not merely result in seeing two identical objects. What we see is an overlay of two versions of the object, which appear to create one new, distorted object, such as a very wide finger, or a finger with a fork in it. But it seems, again, impossible to describe this phenomena without mentioning the objects that are affected. How would we even begin to describe double vision without using examples such as fingers? We need to be able to focus on the effect of double vision on an object to truly understand it at all.
ReplyDeleteAs to whether or not blurriness would be a property of the objects, it would seem that this would not be the case. If I am looking at a book while squinting, the book itself is obviously not blurry objectively. The blurriness is clearly (pun intended) a distortion between myself and the book. This distortion, whether it comes from the medium through which we see things (like an eye, squinting or otherwise) or some physical object between one's self and the book (like a blue piece of glass) is something that, like the book, is also being perceived. The distortion is an object in itself, not a property of the experience but part of what is being experienced.
ReplyDeleteSami - I thought you might say something like that! Here are a couple of things to think about:
ReplyDelete(1) I think it might be important to distinguish between (a) transparency: that none of the features we can introspectively attend to are (intrinsic) features of our experience, and (b) the claim that, in *describing* the features we introspectively attend to, we make use (exclusively?) of the vocabulary of ordinary objects (e.g., 'finger', 'face', 'book'). The question is then whether (b) entails (a) -- whether the fact that we are forced to use such vocabulary in describing the character of, say, blurry or double vision, means that we aren't describing an (intrinsic) feature of the experience at all.
(2) I wonder about your description of double vision: "What we see is an overlay of two versions of the object, which appear to create one new, distorted object, such as a very wide finger, or a finger with a fork in it." I wonder, in particular, if what your visual experience represents here is as clear as "one new...object, such as a very wide finger, or a finger with a fork in it." Is it really clear how many things my experience represents in this case -- whether one, two, or more? You say that "what we see is an overlay of two versions of the object." Well, how many things is that? An overlay is one thing. And then there are two versions of the (same) object -- how many things is that? Two? Or one? (After all, it's the *same* object.) Or maybe we have three things: two distinct objects and their overlay. In any case, shouldn't it be a determinate matter what our experience represents? And is it, plausibly, in this case a determinate matter? If not, then does this tell against transparency?
Rob - It seems that you and Sami have a disagreement, but help me to get clear about your view:
(1) You write: "As to whether or not blurriness would be a property of the objects, it would seem that this would not be the case. If I am looking at a book while squinting, the book itself is obviously not blurry objectively." Well, *no one* thinks that by squinting you actually give objects a feature they didn't have before (blurriness), so I take it that what you mean here is more like this: "As to whether or not blurriness would VISUALLY SEEM TO be a property of the objects, it would seem that this would not be the case. If I am looking at a book while squinting, the book itself obviously DOES not VISUALLY SEEM TO BE blurry objectively." And here, what I mean by "visually seem" is that something visually seems to be a certain way when my visual experience represents it as being that way. So, objects visually seem to be blurry when my visual experience represents them as blurry. And if I'm right about your view, you think that, when my vision is blurry, it DOES NOT represent objects as blurry. So, am I right about your view?
(2) That I am right is strongly suggested by your claim that the blurry "distortion...is something that, like the book, is also being perceived. The distortion is an object in itself," and so, presumably, not a *property* of the book, or even of the experience! In this case, your view is actually consistent with transparency, it's just that you think that blurring your vision actually introduces a new object of perception -- the blurring object -- and that when we attend to the blurriness of our vision, we attend to a feature of this object, not to a feature of our experience. This is an interesting idea. Have I got you right? What does everyone else think of this?
Yes, you are correct. I never meant to imply that the book could even be reasonably considered to be "blurry" all its own. Your insertions of "VISUALLY SEEM TO" accurately depict what I meant. Apologies for the poor word choice and the confusion.
ReplyDeleteRob - Hey, no worries! In philosophy, this is what we do for each other -- we help each other to get clear about our views. Believe me when I say that this can even amount to *most* of the work that we do. So there's no shame (whatsoever!) in not expressing something perfectly clearly the first time (or even the fiftieth time) around. The point is just to try again, and again....
ReplyDeleteIn class, I copied a summary of the problem of transparency from the board, and it helps me to understand what exactly we have to say about the problem of blurred vision to solve it in the name of intentionalism.
ReplyDelete"When we attend (by introspection) to the phenomenal character of an experience, we don't attend to any of its intrinsic features; instead, we end up attending to features of the world as represented by our experience."
So, we must show that the blurriness is a feature of the world as represented by our experience and that it is not an intrinsic feature of the experience.
And, honestly, I don't know where to stand. On one hand, it would seem that when I squint, I am altering my experience of the world, and thus I am adding an intrinsic quality - blurriness - to the world, and this quality is one that is an intrinsic part of this experience. Yet, one could say that I am merely adding the feature of blurriness to my representation of the world and that because I can simply "remove" the blurriness at any time, it is not intrinsic.
Let me try to work out a few thoughts here...
ReplyDeleteIn the case of blurry vision, the "blurriness" isn't really a property of the object. As Rob pointed out, the object isn't blurry, the perception of the object is. Therefore, it would seem that the blurriness is a property of perception.
However, as Sami pointed out with the "darkness" example, there needs to be an object (or a space) that is perceived in order for the blurriness to occur. So, in this case, the blurriness would seem to be a property of the object (or space).
As I understand it then, the obvious answer to the question of "which is the blurriness a property of" is both. The blurriness is a property of the perception of objects. You can't have the blurriness without the perception or without the objects.
How does this relate to transparency? I think it suggests the reason for the transparency of experience. Simply put, what we call "experience" does not exist without the perception and the object. I would go further and argue that you can't (mentally) have one without the other (at the same time). Therefore, any attempt to focus only on the perception (of an object, necessarily) without thinking of the object is impossible (as it is impossible to think of the object without the use of perception).
I'm going to jump in on this one as well. I'll separate my three comments.
ReplyDeleteThis one is going to deal with the "blurriness" discussion thus far.
I want to try to simplify the blurriness problem by creating a simple thought experiment. Imagine for a moment that you are standing with your nose pressed against a white wall (or maybe just go try this), such that your entire field of vision is whitewashed, and has no other characteristic to it. Now blur your vision.
Does it really seem that "blurriness" here is a property of any object at all? The most I think one could say is that the color white has the property of blurriness. But imagine further that this is all you are able to see. Ever. There is nothing else in the world. All you see is white. It seems that you could still blur your vision in the same way that you did when standing in front of the wall, even though there are no objects at all.
Does it really make sense to say "the nothingness is blurry," or "the whiteness is blurry?" I think not. So from this it seems to me that trying to categorize "blurriness" as a property of objects is just nonsense.
Further food for thought on trying to claim that "blurriness" is a property of objects. If this were the case, doesn't it seem that each object, due to being represented differently, should have a "blurriness" characteristic to it, which is also distinct from the "blurriness" of other objects? This just seems ridiculous. Surely one would not try to argue that when squinting, the computer is blurry in a distinctly different manner from, say, the table that the computer is resting on. It seems that they are blurry in the same way. My reasoning for this would be that they are not blurry at all, but rather my visual perception is blurry.
This post is going to deal with the darkness problem.
ReplyDeleteWhen it comes to the "darkness" problem, I don't take this to be a problem at all. Light is essential to the functionality of eyes, so of course blurring your vision in the darkness does not render any noticeable effect. If it's pitch black, I could also put a blue gel in front of my eyes, and it wouldn't affect my vision either, for the simple fact that my eyes aren't able to do much of anything in the absence of light.
Also, that's not really a fair argument, because you can't even see the objects in the dark at all - so you don't give them a chance to become blurry. Actually, quite the contrary, if you think about it, that could be an argument against blurriness as a property of objects by your own logic, because since the objects cannot be seen as blurry now, it seems that "blurriness" might not be a property of objects either.
Also, I think my "white wall" experiment might address this concern from a different perspective.
This post is going to deal with the "distortion as an object" problem and the "double vision" problem.
ReplyDeleteFor the distortion problem, I really have to express my skepticism of this view. It's quite a stretch. Maybe I'm misunderstanding what you are suggesting... Distortion is an object in reality, which comes and goes as I command, and happens to always sit in front of every other object in my visual field? If that is the case, then I suppose that other seemingly qualitative aspects of vision should have the same behavioral characteristic (for example, "happiness" could come and go as I commanded in such a way that my visual field, and thereby all of the objects in it, looks "happy"). Again, this seems like a stretch, though I don't necessarily have a concrete argument against it.
For the "double vision" problem, I have to get on board with Leddington. When I cross my eyes, I certainly cannot say that my vision remains clear, at least in the same way that it did when my eyes were uncrossed. This seems to be the "blurriness" problem reversed in a way: "clarity" seems to be a property of vision, which is lacking when I cross my eyes.
This first post will attempt to summarize where we now stand with the problem of blurriness (as it pertains to transparency), and my second post will return to the original question of whether or not experience really is transparent.
ReplyDeleteAs Josh said (in summarizing transparency): "When we attend (by introspection) to the phenomenal character of an experience, we don't attend to any of its intrinsic features; instead, we end up attending to features of the world as represented by our experience."
Seemingly, the reason blurriness would pose a problem to this viewpoint is because we seem to be adding some sort of “new experience” to our previously well-established conception of the features of the world, or rather, we had representational experience of the features of the world which suddenly seemed to change through some acting agent. Rob described this mysterious agent as a distortion: “This distortion, whether it comes from the medium through which we see things (like an eye, squinting or otherwise) or some physical object between one's self and the book (like a blue piece of glass) is something that, like the book, is also being perceived.” But what can actually be said of this distortion, or does it even exist?
If Rob’s analogy is correct (which I think it is), then seeing the world as blurry is the same as seeing the world through a blue sheet of glass, where things are given the appearance of blueness despite their lack of such intrinsic characteristics. The same can be said of blurriness. This would also enable us to deal with the optical illusions we saw in professor Leddington’s most recent post, as the specific contrast of colors can be said to create a kind of “optical fog” which acts as the blue sheet of glass. This may seem like a stretch, but if light reflecting off water particles can create a rainbow, then I am more enticed to believe it.
I believe we still need to answer the question of whether or not experience really is transparent. So far everyone seems to be agreeing that it is, so I am going to attempt to play devil’s advocate and see if this really is the case.
ReplyDeleteIf transparency is true, then when I have a pain in my toe, it is impossible for me to conceptualize this pain without referring to it as how it exists (as in my toe). I am not entirely convinced that this is the case. If I were to break my arm, could I not imagine (accurately) the pain which would ensue if I were to break my leg? Likewise, doesn’t our general conception of “pain” exist as an idea culminating in all our various experiences of past instances of pain?
Perhaps this appeal to memory is a weak foundation upon which one should base an argument (especially for sensation). In that case, imagine a situation where you currently are in pain: I stubbed my toe, and in that moment I chose to examine the pain in my toe. The advocate of transparency would argue that I could not isolate and examine that pain apart from being a “pain in my toe”. But is this inability the result of transparency, or something else? To ask the question in a different way: Does our inability to express the qualities of color (i.e. explain the color blue to a blind man) affirm transparency (blue can only exist as an intrinsic characteristic of x), or is this the result of some other failing?
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteI’m going to add on to Eric's previous comment. You mentioned that someone in pain has a pain in a certain location, in your example their toe. If that pain was no longer sensed, does that mean the pain is not there or that it does not have phenomenal character? Say you have a wound in your leg. Since your brain has a pain gateway that allows you only to feel pain from one thing, slamming your hand in a door will relieve the pain in your leg. Does this mean the pain in your leg has lost its PC? I believe the phenomenal character of the leg pain is still there you are merely not focusing on it at that moment. More examples of this question arise when considering desensitization.
ReplyDeleteIf it were true that you could only feel pain from one ache at a time, which I'm not sure is necessarily true, then the phenomenal character lies in that pain which you are focusing on, because, as I understand it, phenomenal character is a relation between a conscious being and that which it perceives. If you don't perceive or "feel" a pain that you are in fact physically having, then I'd think that the pain does not have phenomenal character, because it seems that what its like to not feel that pain is the same as what its like not to have that pain at all.
ReplyDelete